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1. Introduction 
The title of this paper reflects the fact truthmaking is quite frequently considered to be expressive of 
realism. What this means, exactly, will become clearer in the course of our discussion, but since we 
are interested in Armstrong’s work on truthmaking in particular, it is natural to start from a brief 
discussion of how truthmaking and realism appear to be associated in his work. Armstrong’s 
interest in truthmaking and the integration of the truthmaker principle to his overall system 
happened only later in his career, especially in his 1997 book A World of States of Affairs and of 
course the 2004 Truth and Truthmakers. Since the 2004 book is the most complete account of 
Armstrong’s thinking with regard to truthmaking, that book will be our primary source (especially 
given that he changed his mind about a few issues between the 1997 and the 2004 books). The 
theme is certainly present in his earlier work as well, but the notion of truthmaking, which 
Armstrong got from C. B. Martin, was not as well formulated in the literature, as the seminal paper 
by Mulligan, Simons and Smith (1984) had not yet popularised the notion. In the introduction of his 
Truth and Truthmakers, Armstrong outlines the origins of the notion in Australia: Martin used the 
idea of truthmaking in his work against counterfactual accounts of material objects due to the 
phenomenalists. Armstrong himself first took advantage of the truthmaker principle in his attempt 
to resist dispositional/subjunctive accounts of mental states due to behaviourists such as Gilbert 
Ryle (Armstrong 1973: 11ff.). The now famous slogan, according to which the truthmaker insight 
‘prevents the metaphysician from letting dispositions “hang on air”’ originates in Armstrong’s 
criticism of Ryle (Armstrong 2004: 3). 
It is thus partly because of this historical usage of the ‘truthmaker insight’ that 
truthmaking is often associated with realism. But the situation is certainly more complicated than 
that when we look into the details. One reason for the complications regarding truthmaking and its 
potential ability to capture realist intuitions is that many of the best known theories of truthmaking 
are very closely tied to certain ontological views that already make realist commitments. Among 
these is Armstrong’s own version of truthmaking, which is integrated with his ontology of states of 
affairs. Naturally, the states of affairs ontology has some important implications for his conception 
of truthmaking. The most obvious of these implications is that, according to Armstrong, 
truthmakers are facts – albeit he prefers to call them states of affairs: ‘entities having such forms as 
a’s being F and a’s having R to b’ (Armstrong 2004: 18). Of course, as Armstrong (2004: 4) readily 
admits, the idea of truthmaking can be separated from the question of what truthmakers in fact are. 
In any case, for Armstrong the truthbearers are true propositions – although there are some caveats, 
e.g., he considers propositions to be ‘possible intentional objects’ and takes it that a ‘naturalist’ 
cannot accept a realm of propositions (ibid, 16; 1997: 131). 
Moving on to the truthmaking relation, there are a couple of things that, I believe, can 
be said without much controversy. One of these is that whatever we take the actual truthmakers to 
be, and, I suppose, even regardless of the nature of the supposed truthmaking relation between 
propositions and reality, we can in any case say that the (possible) correspondence between a 
proposition and the reality, i.e., between the proposition and the truthmaker, is not, in general, a 
one-one correspondence.1 This is the view that Armstrong (2004: 16) takes and, in essence, seems 
to be what many other proponents of truthmaking would go for as well (see for example Lowe 
2006: 182). The reason for opting for a many-many relation is simple enough: a single truthmaker 
can quite clearly be a truthmaker for several truthbearers and correspondingly there might be 
several truthmakers which serve as a sufficient truthmaker for a given proposition. Perhaps it could 
be argued that there is always some minimal truthmaker for each truth, but as Armstrong points out, 
many truths do also have several minimal truthmakers, such as the proposition <there exists an x 
such that x is a human being> (Armstrong 2004: 21).2 Another aspect that appears to be fairly 
uncontroversial is that truthmaking is some kind of an asymmetrical relation between propositions 
and something in the world. This something in the world could be facts or states of affairs, as in 
Armstrong’s case, or tropes, or something quite different, depending on your account of 
truthmakers. Another way to put this is to say that a truthmaker for a particular truth is some portion 
of reality in virtue of which the truth is true. This ‘in virtue of’ relation is generally thought to be 
cross-categorical, the portion of reality being some entity or entities and the other being truth 
(which is not an entity!) (see Armstrong 2004: 5). 
The exact nature of the truthmaking relation is not uncontroversial though: one 
possibility is that it is an entailment relation between the truthmaker and the truth of the 
proposition, but it has also been argued that we are dealing with a grounding relation here, in which 
case truth would be grounded in entities (cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005). There is also the question of 
whether truthmaking is an internal or an external relation (Armstrong 1997: 115–16). Armstrong 
favours the first alternative, and it does perhaps seem initially more plausible that truthmaking is an 
internal relation, but there are various problems with this idea as well (cf. David 2005). Each of 
these issues would require a paper of its own, but we will mostly set them aside here, focusing 
instead on the more general question regarding truthmaking and realism. However, we will need at 
least an initial formulation of the truthmaking relation to get started. Take one formulated in terms 
of the ‘in virtue of’ locution, which produces a familiar truthmaker principle: 
 
(TM) Necessarily, if a proposition <p> is true and has a truthmaker, then there is some 
entity in virtue of which it is true. 
 
This formulation of (TM) entails (though is not the same as) Truthmaker Necessitarianism: the 
existence of a truthmaker is sufficient for the truth of those propositions it makes true. Armstrong 
(2004: 5–7) defends Truthmaker Necessitarianism, appealing to the slogan mentioned above, i.e., if 
a given truth (a true proposition) would lack a truthmaker, then its truth would ‘hang on air’ quite 
like Ryle’s dispositional truths. Indeed Truthmaker Necessitarianism is a widely shared assumption 
amongst truthmaker theorists, even though it is difficult to come up with a conclusive argument in 
favour of it: 
 
I do not have any direct argument [for Truthmaker Necessitarianism]. My hope is that 
philosophers of realist inclinations will be immediately attracted to the idea that a truth, 
                                                 
1 Note that ‘propositions’ could be considered merely as a placeholder here, depending on one’s take on what the 
truthbearers are. 
2 Where the angled brackets describe a proposition, following Horwich (1998). For discussion on minimal truthmakers, 
see Tahko and O’Conaill forthcoming. 
any truth, should depend for its truth for something ‘outside’ it, in virtue of which it is 
true. (Armstrong 2004: 7.) 
 
We will not discuss Truthmaker Necessitarianism in much more detail than this, nor the other one 
of Armstrong’s controversial theses, Truthmaker Maximalism, i.e., the thesis that every truth must 
have a truthmaker.3 (TM) does not, of course, entail Truthmaker Maximalism. 
 
2. Truthmaking and realism 
It is well-known that Armstrong postulates an intimate connection between truthmaking and 
realism. The mediator here is correspondence, or more precisely, the correspondence theory of 
truth. It appears that, for Armstrong, truthmaker theory could be understood simply as a more 
sophisticated version of the correspondence theory. There are several passages in Armstrong’s work 
that explicitly suggest this: 
 
[T]he Correspondence theory tells us that, since truths require a truthmaker, there is 
something in the world that corresponds to a true proposition. The correspondent and the 
truthmaker are the same thing. (1997: 128.) 
 
Propositions correspond or fail to correspond to reality. [If Armstrong’s view of 
propositions is correct], then it becomes pretty clear that the correspondence theory of 
truth can and should be upheld. (2004: 16.) 
 
The terms of the correspondence relation are truthmakers and truths. Truthmakers entail 
truths. Our favoured truthmakers are states of affairs or their constituents. (1997: 131.) 
 
Note however that especially in A World of States of Affairs, Armstrong emphasises that truthmaker 
theory is not only compatible with (the idea of) the correspondence theory of truth, but also with the 
redundancy theory of truth (if it is to be called a theory of truth at all) (1997: 128).4 Be that as it 
may, in the secondary literature Armstrong’s appeal to the correspondence theory in his formulation 
of the truthmaker theory has been received with some hostility. Typically, this is because the 
motivation seems to be exactly to argue in favour of realism. Consider how Helen Beebee and 
Julian Dodd put it in their influential volume on truthmaking: 
 
Suppose that some formulation of truthmaker theory does indeed succeed in capturing 
realist intuitions. The question arises, how can truthmaker theory now legitimately be put 
                                                 
3 For a brief defence of Truthmaker Maximalism, see Rodriguez-Pereyra 2006. 
4 Incidentally, one might also ask whether the truthmaker theory is a theory of truth. Certainly, if we have merely a 
stripped down truthmaker principle, then we are not dealing with a complete theory of truth. But once the truthmaker 
principle is combined with an appropriate ontology, then I would be inclined to say that we do indeed have a complete 
theory of truth, as we can give a full account of the truthbearers and the truthmakers. But the core of truthmaking is the 
truthmaker principle, and if it turns out to be compatible with different ontologies (as will be proposed below), then it is 
at least a promising starting point for a complete theory of truth. 
to use in an argument for realism (about a particular domain) and against anti-realism? If 
truthmaker theory itself enshrines a commitment to realism, then presumably the 
appropriate anti-realist reaction to such an argument is simply to deny whatever 
truthmaker principle is being used as a premise in that argument. If a given truthmaker 
principle is to pull its weight in arguments against anti-realism, then we had better have 
reasons, independently of our commitment to realism, for believing that the principle is 
true. We wonder whether such reasons are to be had. (Beebee and Dodd 2005: 16.) 
 
So if Armstrong’s postulated connection between truthmaker theory and realism truly holds, then 
Beebee and Dodd insist that we should be able to put forward a truthmaker principle that would be 
able to capture our realist intuitions while not being compatible with anti-realism. Even if we were 
to succeed in that, we would still have to show that there are reasons, independently of our realist 
intuitions, to believe that our truthmaker principle is the correct one, as otherwise the use of 
truthmaking in arguments against anti-realism will just be question-begging. Perhaps this can be 
done, but as we have seen, Armstrong’s own project seems to postulate a very intimate connection 
between truthmaking and realism.  
However, if we were to concede that truthmaker theory fails to cash out our realist 
intuitions, at least without leaving room for other interpretations, then what would the cost be, 
precisely? Well, provided that truthmaker theory is at least compatible with realism – which it 
surely is – then the possibility that it might be able to accommodate other than realist intuitions 
might not be so harmful. In other words, if truthmaking turned out to be an ontologically neutral 
way of talking about truth we could of course still combine it with a realist ontology. Now, this is of 
course not an answer to the challenge posed by Beebee and Dodd. Rather, the proposal is that the 
price that Armstrong might have to pay is not all that high. But this line of argument is only feasible 
once it is clear that truthmaker theory can be presented in an ontologically neutral way and if 
realism itself can stand on its own. So let us now move to a discussion of truthmaker theory 
combined with various alternatives to realism. 
 
3. Truthmaking as ontologically neutral 
If we wish to find an ontologically neutral formulation of the truthmaker principle, then this is 
likely to impose some constraints. For that reason, certain usual formulations are unlikely to work. 
Consider one typical formulation, as presented by Beebee and Dodd: 
 
(TM-E) Necessarily, if <p> is true, then there exists at least one entity α such that <α 
exists> entails <<p> is true>. (Beebee and Dodd 2005: 2.) 
 
The nature of the truthmaking relation, here suggested to be an entailment relation, is 
perhaps the most controversial part of (TM-E). Of course, other problems may emerge when certain 
truths, such as necessary truths or negative truths are considered. There have been numerous 
attempts to deal with these problems, but the details of each solution depend, often heavily, on the 
details of the ontology that one wishes to combine with truthmaking, and accordingly these 
problems are not something that we should focus on here. However, a somewhat neutral way to 
address the problems involved with entailment is to replace entailment with (metaphysical) 
necessitation: in every possible world where a truthmaker for a certain proposition exists, that 
proposition is true. This is the line that was taken in the initial formulation given in this paper (TM) 
and it would seem to be preferable to Armstrong (1997: 115) as well (see also Lowe 2006: 185). 
Some key features of the truthmaker principle were listed earlier and at least some of them 
would also seem to hold in regard to the general principle that we are now looking for. So, we can 
for example without much risk of controversy say that truthmaking is an asymmetrical many-many 
relation. Also, as Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005: 20–1) suggests, we seem to have the intuition that truth 
is asymmetrical, and the truthmaker principle fits this intuition perfectly. The way that Rodriguez-
Pereyra puts it is that truth is grounded: the truth of a proposition depends on what reality is like, 
and the relationship between truth and reality is of course asymmetrical, for reality does not depend 
on the truth of the proposition. As he points out, this by itself does not commit us to realism, for an 
idealist (for instance) could just add that the reality or the world and the entities in it are not mind-
independent (ibid.). 
Moreover, Chris Daly (2005) has suggested that there is one issue that advocates of 
different truthmaker theories always agree upon: truthmaking does some explanatory work. This is 
of course a rather natural source for motivation to go truthmaker theory in the first place. 
Ultimately, this motivation concerns the nature of the truthmaking relation, for whatever 
explanatory work the truthmaker principle might do, it must surely have something to do with the 
relationship between propositions and truthmakers. So what are our options for motivating 
truthmaking? According to Daly (2005: 102), there are three options. The first one is what he calls 
the ‘Canadian mountie’ theory of truthmakers, the idea of which is to argue from examples and to 
show that we can, in fact, always find a truthmaker for any given truth. Daly accuses this theory of 
being ad hoc, in that it assumes the truthmaker principle without giving any justification for it. 
Presumably the point is that we need more than a working theory of truthmaking to motivate the 
idea in the first place. This would appear to be a valid request. 
The second strategy suggests that truthmaker theory could help in finding explanations to 
further ontological problems, such as the theory of universals. Daly (2005: 98–102) argues against 
Rodriguez-Pereyra’s suggestion, namely that truthmakers could explain universals by entailing that 
it is true that there are some properties which are shared by several distinct particulars. There are 
other alternatives as well though, one of them being Josh Parsons’s (2005) rather plausible idea that 
truthmaking could be used to motivate arguments concerning propositions about the past and the 
future and thus might provide some explanatory power when discussing theories of time, such as 
presentism. However, while I am not against the idea of granting the possibility that truthmaking 
could help motivate arguments concerning other ontological problems, I do not believe that this by 
itself is a sufficient condition for adopting the truthmaker principle; and neither, of course, does 
Daly. 
The third strategy that Daly (2005: 94–8) considers, namely inference to the best 
explanation, is perhaps the most common. According to this strategy, truthmaking explains our pro-
realism intuitions and grasps the core idea of the correspondence theory of truth. This is of course 
the core motivation that we are now interested in. Daly considers Armstrong’s and Bigelow’s 
theories in this connection. Here we are faced with the central question: could truthmaking offer a 
way to characterise a theory of truth compatible with realism? But we have to be careful here, for 
even if truthmaking is compatible with realism, it does not mean that it would explain why realism 
is any better than other alternatives. Indeed, it seems that the truthmaker principle is in no way 
connected with any necessarily realist premises, especially if it is compatible with, say, pragmatism 
and idealism as well (which is a suggestion we will consider briefly). 
There is one further complication. Recall that Armstrong seems to consider truthmaking to 
be effectively a more sophisticated version of the correspondence theory – and this is in fact a major 
reason for the claim that it captures realist intuitions. If this were indeed the case, then it would 
seem difficult to combine truthmaking with anything but realism. But this is where things get 
interesting, for Daly argues that the same ontological neutrality thesis applies to the 
Correspondence Intuition (CI) as well, formulated in the following way: 
 
(CI) <p> is true if and only if things are as <p> says they are. (Daly 2005: 96.) 
 
The apparent problem with (CI), however, is that it appears to be vacuous: (CI) is 
compatible with just about any theory of truth, and hence its explanatory value cannot be 
particularly high. Yet, if truthmaker theory is supposed to be explanatory, it better capture 
something more than just (CI). Armstrong himself (2004: Ch. 4) certainly claims that the 
truthmaker principle could say something more than (CI) does – this will be done by combining the 
correspondence relation with the truthmaker principle and his states of affairs ontology – but 
consider Daly’s analysis of (CI): 
 
Consider the coherence theorist. He may consistently say ‘If <p> is true, it has a 
truthmaker. <p> corresponds to a state of affairs, namely the state of affairs which 
consists of a relation of coherence holding between <p> and the other members of a 
maximal set of propositions’. Consider the pragmatist. He may consistently say, ‘If <p> 
is true, it has a truthmaker. <p> corresponds to a state of affairs, namely the state of 
affairs of <p>’s having the property of being useful to believe’. It is controversial 
whether there exist states of affairs. Let that pass. My point here is that the coherence 
theory and the pragmatic theory are each compatible with the admission of states of 
affairs. Furthermore, each of these theories is compatible with the admission of states of 
affairs standing in a correspondence relation to truths. (Daly 2005: 97.) 
 
So Daly’s case against the third strategy (to guarantee the explanatory value of truthmaker 
theory and hence motivate it) is based on the claim that the truthmaker principle does not restrict 
our choices in terms of ontology in any way and thus truthmaking understood in the lines of 
Armstrong and Bigelow is just as vacuous as (CI). This is indeed a valid concern, for if truthmaking 
is understood as a special case of the correspondence theory, then it seems to inherit all of its 
original problems. 
However, it seems trivial that the truthmaker principle could be combined with different 
ontologies once we acknowledge the idea that truthmaking is quite separate from the varying 
answers concerning the actual truthmakers and truthbearers. Furthermore, as already noted, 
Armstrong (2004: 4) seems to have no quarrel with the idea that truthmaking may be compatible 
with very different accounts of truthmakers and truthbearers. This is really the only thing that 
counts: it ought to be one’s account of truthmakers and truthbearers that introduce the (important) 
ontological commitments, not the truthmaker principle itself. Accordingly, I think that Armstrong 
and other advocates of realist truthmaker theories could very well be content with a somewhat 
weakened condition when it comes to the truthmaker principle, namely, that the truthmaker 
principle is the best way to characterise the correspondence relation understood in a realist sense. 
When put like this, the details of our ontology are still open, but the motivation for truthmaking is 
still clear: it is the best way to formulate the realist understanding of the correspondence relation. 
This hints towards a fourth strategy for motivating truthmaking in addition to the three suggested by 
Daly, and in fact I think that the fourth strategy is closer to how most truthmaker theorists would 
like to motivate their theories. 
 
4. Realism can stand on its own 
The strategy for motivating truthmaking that is now emerging rests on this very simple point: 
realism can stand on its own. In other words, we do not need truthmaking (or the correspondence 
theory, for that matter) to motivate realism. This reflects Michael Devitt’s (1997) classic work on 
the topic of realism and truth. Compared to Daly’s third strategy, this changes the direction of 
explanation. It could be said that this fourth strategy does not so much try to provide an explanation, 
but a justification, although in another sense it can be thought to provide an explanation as well, as 
we will shortly see. In any case, what is important is that because realism can stand on its own, 
those of us who are realists can motivate truthmaking with realism – not the other way around. 
While this type of strategy is not clearly present in Armstrong’s writings, I do believe that he might 
have welcomed it. 
If we start with a realist ontology and if truthmaking increases the plausibility of the 
overall theory, then it seems rather straightforward to choose the way to go: realism plus 
truthmaking is the best theory available. But in order for this strategy to be plausible, we ought to 
see some more evidence to the effect that, say, idealists or pragmatists would also be happy with the 
proposed truthmaker principle. To this effect, the principle would have to be such that an idealist or 
pragmatist could insert their desired truthmakers and truthbearers into the principle. There may be 
some limitations here. For one thing, on all the usual formulations, the truthmakers are taken to be 
entities of some kind. It is certainly a matter of debate what kind of entities they are, but it might be 
objected that, say, a pragmatist would not be happy about the commitment to ‘entities’ in any form 
whatsoever. So how could pragmatism be compatible with truthmaking? Positive accounts arguing 
to this effect are scarce, but Sami Pihlström (2005) has outlined some options. Pihlström suggests 
that pragmatists such as Hilary Putnam (at times) and Nelson Goodman could very well be 
considered as taking advantage of a version of truthmaking, whereby the truthbearers and the 
‘world’ that makes them true (i.e., the truthmakers) are human constructions, ‘made’ by us in the 
process of representing and acting. Now, whether this constitutes a commitment to entities or not is 
perhaps debatable – maybe ‘human constructions’ are to be considered as entities. But there appears 
to be no reason why this type of picture couldn’t be represented with a truthmaker principle not 
unlike the ones we have been discussing. 
A more general point to note is the following. If we take truthmakers to be entities, 
there are several alternatives available, such as Armstrong’s states of affairs or tropes, as suggested 
in Mulligan, Simons and Smith (1984). There is not much that can be said about the nature of the 
truthmakers without a commitment to a particular ontology. However, personally I would be 
inclined to part ways with Armstrong here, for it seems to me that the apparent complexity of truth 
suggests that truthmakers must be spread out in several different categories rather than just one. 
This complexity manifests itself in the variety of things we consider to be true: mathematical 
theorems, laws of physics, that Hesperus and Phosphorus are identical, and so on. Introducing a 
further category of facts or states of affairs to account for all truthmakers is not ontologically 
parsimonious; why not say that the truthmakers are just the very entities that a given true 
proposition concerns? This line of thought has also been noted by Beebee and Dodd (2005: 9) and it 
is exactly what Lowe (2005: 182 ff.) argues for as well. 
Returning to the issue concerning a commitment to entities, we might note that one 
could attempt to formulate truthmaking in a manner that does not entail a commitment to entities at 
all, perhaps in the lines of McFetridge’s (1990) suggestion that every true sentence must have an 
explanation of why it is true. This would seem to release us from the commitment to entities, but it 
also distances us from the original idea of truthmaking. In fact, it appears that this would take us 
back towards a vacuous principle. McFetridge’s proposal is another attempt to combine 
truthmaking and our realist intuitions so that we would have an argument against anti-realism (see 
Liggins 2005 for details of how this might be done). This is a line of thought that we have already 
distanced ourselves from. Of course, we can easily modify the truthmaker principle in such a way 
that an explicit commitment to entities is removed, but it is questionable whether this really does the 
trick. Consider (TM*): 
 
(TM*) Necessarily, if a proposition <p> is true and has a truthmaker, then there is some α in 
virtue of which it is true. 
 
Here the entailment relation has been replaced with metaphysical necessitation, as in 
the original (TM). In fact, you’ll notice that (TM*) differs from the original (TM) only in replacing 
the explicit reference to entities with a reference to the unspecified ‘α’. Have we been moving in 
circles? Not as such: what has changed is the order of explanation. Truthmaking is now understood 
as a tool to help characterise one’s ontology, not a way to motivate the ontology itself. To that 
effect, all we need is that the truthmaker principle is compatible across different ontologies. (TM*) 
is obviously compatible with realist ontologies, in which case it is likely that we would want to add 
that what makes <p> true is the existence of an entity of some kind. A pragmatist, on the other 
hand, could replace α with ‘human construction’, as suggested by Pihlström. Whether or not this 
avoids the commitment to entities is another question, but one that I consider an ancillary issue. As 
for idealists, they could presumably interpret existence so that it does not require material existence, 
although I am not aware of any idealist accounts which would employ truthmaking explicitly. 
Naturally, we need to add something to (TM*) to give it any explanatory power, as the 
nature of the truthmaking relation depends on what α is – and now also on how we interpret 
existence. Indeed, (TM*) is just the spine of truthmaking as we need to say something about α to 
determine how it makes <p> true. However, the relative weakness of (TM*) is exactly why the 
principle is plausible across ontologies: it could perhaps be interpreted as a family of relations that 
covers all possible kinds of truthmakers. Of course, in (TM*) the truthbearers are still taken to be 
propositions, which might not satisfy everyone (or every ontology). But I would not be too 
concerned about this, given that Armstrong himself wishes to avoid a commitment to propositions 
and reinterprets them as ‘possible intentional objects’, in accordance with his naturalistic agenda. 
Accordingly, perhaps there is room to interpret propositions as well in accordance with various 
ontologies. 
The upshot is that truthmaking is not, or does not have to be, an explanation for, or a 
case in favour of our realist intuitions. Perhaps truthmaking does increase the appeal of realism, for 
the explanatory power of the complete theory (realism plus truthmaking) is certainly greater with 
truthmaking than without it. In this sense, truthmaking may still make a contribution towards 
explanatory power. But an idealist or a pragmatist can, perhaps, make the same claim. In any case, 
there seem to be strong reasons to think that the question of realism is independent of the question 
of truth. Armstrong may have wanted something more than this out of truthmaker theory, but it may 
be enough that truthmaker theory is a plausible way to account for truth within a realist ontology. A 
particularly forceful reason to think so is that, in the lines of Michael Dummett’s (e.g. 1991) 
influential work, the anti-realist’s strongest case against realism may be exactly that realism is 
unable to account for truth in a satisfactory manner, given the shortcomings of the correspondence 
theory. If truthmaker theory can now offer an ontologically neutral way to account for truth, then 
this argument dissipates. Realism can stand on its own, and truthmaking is a way to account for 
truth regardless of one’s ontology. This is really all that Armstrong or any realist proponent of 
truthmaker theory needs: a plausible way to account for truth within a realist ontology. 
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